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In the span of seven weeks in fall 2011, the government of Qatar twice made international headlines for reasons that were, for the upstart Gulf 
emirate, highly unusual.  Made prominent 
by its near-ubiquitous involvement in 
political and humanitarian crises abroad 
— in Darfur, Libya, Syria and even the 
U.S. Gulf Coast in the aftermath of 2005’s 
Hurricane Katrina — one aspect of Qatar 
that receives far less scrutiny, even on its 
state-owned Al-Jazeera satellite network, 
is politics at home.  Thus did speculation 
mount when a September 2011 salary hike 
of an eye-popping 60 percent for citizens 
working in the public sector (120 percent 
for those in the police and military) was 
followed almost immediately by another 
out-of-the-blue announcement: the coun-
try’s first-ever parliamentary elections 
would be held in the second half of 2013.
 Given the individualistic nature of 
decision making in this small city-state, 
observers were left to wonder about the 
motivations of senior leaders, in particular 
Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani.  Did 
the ruling family perceive a change in pop-
ular attitude belied by the placid surface 
of domestic politics in Qatar, the country 
outwardly least affected by demands for 
change witnessed even in neighboring 
Gulf societies since the beginning of the 
Arab Spring?  Or did the government 
hope mainly to head off a growing chorus 
of critics who noted the contrast between 
Qatar’s ideological and material support 
for revolutionaries seeking to topple other 
nondemocratic Arab regimes, and its own 
lack of accountability?  
 Whatever the case, few disagreed that 
the emir was playing with house money.  
Pressure for political change was emanat-
ing neither from citizens nor from Western 
backers such as the United States, what-
ever the apparent contradictions.  A set 
of public-opinion surveys by the Social 
and Economic Survey Research Institute 
(SESRI) of Qatar University revealed that, 
even prior to the fall announcements, con-
fidence in government institutions among 
Qatari citizens had grown considerably 
in the wake of the Arab uprisings, while 
popular interest in democracy — and in-
deed in politics generally — had moved in 
the opposite direction.1  And, as strategic 
interests had already outweighed American 
idealism in the case of a far more advanced 
reform movement in nearby Bahrain, the 
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chance of a U.S. push to alter the political 
status quo in Qatar approached zero.  To 
boost salaries and introduce limited citizen 
participation in governance, then, seemed a 
prudent, preemptive initiative that at worst 
rendered Qatar’s gigantic natural-gas-fund-
ed budget surplus somewhat less immense.
 The question, then, is: What went 
wrong?  Nearly a year later, not only have 
the government’s blockbuster moves failed 
to provide a boost in popular approval, but 
a new poll conducted by SESRI in June 
2012 shows that confidence in basic state 
institutions has receded in many cases 
below even pre-Arab Spring levels.  Since 
June 2011, the percentage of Qataris who 
say they are “very confident” in the armed 
forces has dropped from 87 percent to 78 
percent; confidence in the courts has de-
creased from 72 percent to 62 percent; and, 
most ironically, confidence in the Shura 
Council, Qatar’s soon-to-be-elected advi-
sory body, decreased from 65 percent to 54 
percent, the largest relative decline for any 
single institution included in the survey.  
At the same time, deference to the state has 
similarly declined. When asked whether 
they agreed that “citizens should always 
support the decisions of government even 
if they disagree with those decisions,” 42 
percent strongly agreed, down from 47 
percent a year earlier. What is going on?
 As elsewhere in the region, a signifi-
cant number of Qataris are defying the 
decades-old noble lie of Gulf politics: 
that citizens of resource-based, distribu-
tive regimes are motivated above all by 
economics.  Home to the world’s wealthi-
est citizens, Qatar is casually cited as the 
archetypical example of the way that mate-
rial satisfaction begets political satisfaction 
and even political apathy.  Yet, if the Arab 
Spring so far has failed to bring fundamen-
tal change to the Gulf monarchies, one still 
hopes it will be credited with hastening a 
transformation at least in thinking about 
the region’s politics.  For, while economic 
issues have played a role in generating 
support for reform across the Arab Gulf, 
even more important as mobilizing forces 
have been matters of group identity and 
conflict — distinctions along the lines of 
sect, region, tribal versus non-tribal, and 
Islamist versus secular.
 In Bahrain, for instance, the Shia- and 
secular-led opposition has sustained a 
decade-long protest movement, not on a 
platform of socioeconomic equality, but 
in demand for political equality and other 
basic democratic reforms promised by 
King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa upon his 
succession in 1999.  More recently, in the 
aftermath of the February 2011 uprising, 
the state has used the specter of Iranian 
expansionism to mobilize Sunni citizens 
against the opposition as an imagined Shia 
fifth column, polarizing society along 
sectarian lines and precluding resolution 
of the country’s two-year political cri-
sis.  In Saudi Arabia, a reform movement 
once limited mainly to the kingdom’s Shia 
minority sees increasing appeal among 
other citizens structurally excluded from 
the political and economic benefits enjoyed 
by the Najdi tribal ruling elite.2  And in the 
United Arab Emirates, the state’s ongoing 
security crackdown against individuals 
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
“has contributed to the construction of a 
‘them and us’ mentality which never be-
fore existed” among the country’s wealthy, 
close-knit and comparatively homogenous 
citizenry.3  Qatar is no exception to this 
pattern of group-based competition.
GROUP POLITICS
 The small size and relative homoge-
neity of Qatar’s citizenry compared to 
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poll in 2011, more than 93 percent of the 
1,000 respondents said they would “prefer 
not” to have foreigners as neighbors.
 Rather than a xenophobic rejection of 
outsiders per se, such sentiment reflects 
growing alarm among many citizens at 
what is viewed as pervasive and unchecked 
Western influence, both in the cultural and 
political-mil-
itary realms.  
In the first 
place, ordi-
nary Qataris 
wish to avoid 





family-oriented culture, which features 
the same Wahhabi branch of Islam more 
closely associated with Saudi Arabia. 
Qatar’s deepening political and military 
relationship with the United States is a 
separate source of unease.  If some Qataris 
no doubt welcome greater U.S. support 
at a time when a military showdown over 
Iran’s nuclear program seems always just 
over the horizon, others maintain a more 
cynical reading of American intentions.  
 A common view accuses the United 
States of using Qatar to help carry out its 
own regional designs, first in Libya and 
now in Syria. In accepting the diplomatic 
embrace of Washington, the argument 
continues, Qatar has compromised its 
historically amicable relations with Iran 
while creating new adversaries where 
none existed before — to say nothing of 
the billions of dollars spent in the process.  
When asked in a June 2012 survey to name 
“the most important problem Qatar faces 
today,” only 5 percent of citizens identified 
political issues.  Yet, of these, more than 
other Gulf populations, combined with its 
overwhelming concentration in and around 
the capital, Doha, might seem to militate 
against the rise of identity politics. In fact, 
various group-based differences retain 
social if not political relevance, including 
race (a modest proportion of citizens are 
of African descent), ethnicity and reli-
gion (Qatar 










origin, and status as a naturalized versus 
“original” citizen.  But in a country where 
nationals account for fewer than one in six 
residents, far more salient is the divide be-
tween Qataris and expatriates.  Increasing-
ly, this divide has graduated from mutual 
estrangement to more open conflict, and it 
has begun to spill over from social life into 
the political arena.
 In the past five years alone, Qatar’s 
population has nearly doubled, from around 
880,000 in 2006 to almost 1.7 million in 
2011.  Despite a high (albeit declining) 
birth rate and some naturalization, nation-
als still are thought to number only around 
250,000.  (That no official demographic 
breakdown exists speaks to the sensitiv-
ity of the issue.)  Now, a half-decade of 
record-setting immigration has stretched 
the limits of Qataris’ tolerance for expatri-
ate workers.  Eight in 10 Qataris said they 
“would be very unhappy” to have foreign-
ers as their neighbors, according to a 2012 
SESRI survey, compared to just 42 percent 
of expatriate respondents.  In a separate 
The perennial crises over Iran and its 
nuclear program are acts in an extended 
geopolitical drama aimed at guaranteeing 
lucrative arms sales and a continued 
military foothold in the Gulf states, the 
latter forced to pay for U.S. protection 
both in treasure and in lost autonomy.
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developments include a new dress code at 
Doha’s largest public park, and a brigade 
of female volunteer cultural police who 
have several times accosted inappropri-
ately clad women in shopping centers.
 The debate surrounding access to, and 
the content of, education in Qatar has as-
sumed particular significance, precisely be-
cause it mirrors the larger tension between 
Western-style (and Western-operated) 
development and the preservation of lo-
cal tradition and control.  At the center of 
Qatar’s long-term strategy to move toward 
a “knowledge-based economy” is Educa-
tion City, a 14-square-kilometer campus 
with branches of six American universi-
ties, including Georgetown, Northwestern 
and Carnegie Mellon.  Meanwhile, the 
country’s entire pre-university educational 
system is a product of the U.S.-based 
RAND Corporation, commissioned in 
2001 to overhaul Qatari schools.  It is pub-
lic misgivings over such Western domina-
tion — with RAND’s historical ties to the 
U.S. military adding fuel to the fire — that 
has spurred wide-ranging efforts to reassert 
national and cultural ownership over the 
educational sphere.
 To combat the perception of Education 
City as a collection of foreign enclaves, the 
entire entity has been rebranded in distinct-
ly unassailable fashion.  Students returning 
for the fall 2012 semester were welcomed 
back to an unfamiliar place — Hamad bin 
Khalifa University, in explicit honor of 
the emir — with individual institutions 
described now as “partners” and even 
undertaking separate orientations.5  At the 
same time, Qatar University students re-
turned not only to Arabic as their primary 
language of instruction, but to a revised 
and well-advertised code of “university eti-
quette.”  Meant to check the encroachment 
of Western dress and public behavior on 
70 percent referred to Qatar’s interventions 
abroad, which respondents faulted vari-
ously for “solving other countries’ prob-
lems,” “paying a lot of money for other 
countries,” “[earning the] criticism of other 
Arab countries,” and, most commonly, 
“making new enemies.” 
 Still other Qataris, and indeed many 
Sunni Gulf Arabs generally, would go even 
further to suggest a much larger conspir-
acy: that the post-Iraq War record of U.S. 
foreign policy demonstrates a deliberate 
effort to empower Shii Iran as a regional 
counterweight to the Gulf monarchies.  
By this view, the perennial crises over 
Iran and its nuclear program are acts in an 
extended geopolitical drama aimed at guar-
anteeing lucrative arms sales and a contin-
ued military foothold in the Gulf states, the 
latter forced to pay for U.S. protection both 
in treasure and in lost autonomy.  
 The concern over cultural invasion has 
prompted several recent citizen campaigns 
that edged dangerously close to the limits 
of political expression.  In January 2012, 
only a month after the sale of alcohol 
was banned for unspecified reasons at a 
luxury island development popular among 
expatriates, citizens launched an online 
campaign to boycott the national airline, 
in part because of its own sales of alcohol 
and pork products via a subsidiary.  Later 
in January, Qatar University was ordered 
to reverse a controversial English-language 
instruction policy instituted in 2005, over 
complaints that it discriminated against 
nationals and created, as described in one 
of a series of scathing editorials in a local 
Arabic daily, a “devastating war” between 
Qatari students and “the favored sons of 
expats.”4  Over the next six months, Qatar 
would host no fewer than three sympo-
sia on Arabic language and culture, one 
organized by the university itself.  Other 
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POLITICAL ATTITUDES
 That there is growing ambivalence in 
Qatar over the country’s openness to and 
reliance upon the West, then, is clear. Yet, 
a more fundamental question remains: Is 
the heightened controversy actually related 
to the general shift in public opinion ob-
served over the previous year?  That is, are 
Qataris’ attitudes about foreign influence 
related in predictable ways to their wider 
political views?  Are citizens who worry 
more about Westernization or Western 
involvement in domestic affairs also more 
likely to hold more negative orientations 
toward the government or to challenge its 
policies?
 In a word, yes. Analysis of nationally 
representative survey data from both 2011 
and 2012 demonstrates not only that such 
an individual-level relationship exists, 
but that its substantive significance has 
increased notably over the previous year.  
Qataris were asked in each poll to name, 
without prompting or a list, the country 
what remains a conservative, gender-seg-
regated campus, the new rules proscribe, 
among other things, “fad hair styles” and 
otherwise “unconventional cuts.”
 While Qatar’s deepening political 
and military cooperation with the United 
States has not been the focus of similar 
social activism, this is due not only to the 
recognized sensitivity of the subject but 
also to efforts to downplay 
the extent of the cooperation.  
The thousands of American 
personnel stationed at Al-
Udeid, the largest U.S. air 
base in the Middle East, are 
situated some 40 kilometers 
outside of Doha, and their 
movements in public are 
restricted and inconspicuous.  
What is more, neither side 
officially acknowledges the 
existence of other U.S. instal-
lations, including a secret new 
missile-defense radar station 
first reported in July in The 
Wall Street Journal.6
 But the burgeoning U.S.-
Qatari relationship has not 
gone unnoticed, either domestically or 
internationally.  In April, both the promi-
nent Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya news net-
work and Iran’s state-run Press TV briefly 
published a false report of a thwarted coup 
in Qatar by senior military defectors, an 
action ostensibly provoked by the emir’s 
“excessive alignment with U.S. foreign 
policy and breaking of Arab ranks.”7  In 
the story, later explained as having been 
planted by Syrian supporters of President 
Bashar al-Assad, Qatar’s ruler is rescued 
only with the intervention of U.S. special 
forces, whisked away from his besieged 



















Figure 1. “A Great Deal of Confidence” in 
Government Institutions, by Threat Perception
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 Compared to overall averages of 56 
percent in 2011 and 52 percent in 2012, 
confidence in government institutions 
among those who identified the United 
States was just 43 percent in 2011, and a 
surprising 25 percent in 2012.  Even more 
dramatic is the discrepancy in citizens’ 
reported political deference.  When asked 
in 2011, 47 percent of Qataris “strongly 
agreed” that citizens should 
always support the decisions 
of their government, while 42 
percent “strongly agreed” in 
2012.  Among those who felt 
most threatened by the United 
States, however, these propor-
tions reached only 28 percent 
and 11 percent, respectively.  
Finally, when asked in 2012 
to select the top national pri-
orities for Qatar over the next 
10 years, only 28 percent of 
Qataris listed as their first or 
second choice “giving people 
more say in important gov-
ernment decisions.”  Among 
Qataris wary of the United 
States, more than 43 percent 
said the same.
 There are several reasons to have 
confidence in these results.  First, apart 
from being disproportionately young — 
33 versus an overall average of 37 — and 
male, the group of citizens who perceive 
the United States as Qatar’s greatest threat 
is not distinguished by some underlying 
social or economic characteristic(s) that 
might be driving the statistical association 
between anti-Western orientations and 
wider domestic political views.  These citi-
zens are neither poorer, nor less educated, 
nor more religious than the average Qatari, 
and they are not limited to a specific 
geographical area.  A second reason for 
they believed posed the greatest threat to 
Qatar.  Only four answers gained more 
than 5 percent of responses: Israel, Iran, 
the United States and no country.9  When 
one compares these answers to respon-
dents’ more general political orientations, 
one finds that two perceived threats stand 
out from the rest: the United States, and 
none at all.
 In both 2011 and 2012, Qataris who 
named the two other common responses 
— Iran and Israel — held attitudes toward 
the government that were neither more nor 
less extreme than the average.  By con-
trast, those who perceived (or claimed to 
perceive) no external threat at all reported 
significantly greater confidence in govern-
ment institutions as well as higher defer-
ence to government decisions.10  However, 
the relatively small group of citizens who 
identified the United States — less than 
10 percent of respondents in each year — 
reported much more negative orientations 



















Figure 2. “Strongly Agree” That Citizens Should 
Support Government Decisions Even if They 
Disagree with Them, by Threat Perception
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confidence is that the same underlying as-
sociations are observed in two independent 
sets of data based on surveys undertaken a 
year apart.  Finally, and perhaps most im-
portant, the relationships observed among 
Qatari citizens do not hold for expatriate 
residents, whether Arab or non-Arab, who 
participated in the same surveys.  The link 
between anti-Western and anti-government 
attitudes in Qatar exists, as one should 
expect, only among Qatari nationals.
 While these findings do not suggest 
the impending rise of organized political 
opposition in Qatar, they do help explain 
the state’s puzzling failure to secure a po-
litical boost following two unprecedented 
decisions intended to operate simultane-
ously on the political and economic levels.  
In effect, the government’s medicine was 
ill-suited to treat the condition, which is 
neither popular dissatisfaction with living 
standards per se,11 nor a widespread desire 
for involvement in the quotidian stuff of 
everyday politics.  Many Qataris simply 
question the direction of the socioeco-
nomic experiment that is their country and 
wonder about their ultimate place in it.  
Such was clear even in the pointed debate 
sparked by the 60 percent public-sector 
salary hike, which citizens welcomed not 
on the grounds of rising costs of living, but 
for rectifying a perceived disparity in the 
value attached to Qataris and expatriates.
PORTENDING THE FUTURE?
 Unfortunately for those concerned 
about the social and cultural impact of 
foreigners in Qatar, it seems destined only 
to increase over the coming decade.  The 
country will require hordes of new migrant 
laborers to complete a planned $250 bil-
lion worth of construction and infrastruc-
ture projects in time to host its prized 2022 
FIFA World Cup.12  In turn, a fresh cadre 
of white-collar workers must be recruited 
to manage and operate the gargantuan proj-
ect, to say nothing of preparations for and 
execution of the actual month-long event 
itself.  The implications of this ongoing 
transformation are not limited to the social 
realm.  Traffic congestion, already identi-
fied by both citizens and expatriates as the 
country’s single greatest problem,13 cannot 
but worsen, a planned new underground 
train system notwithstanding.
 Already an entire new city, Lusail, is 
under construction along the coast north of 
Doha.  It is thought to be in part a solution 
to another World Cup problem: the arrival 
of hundreds of thousands of football fans. 
They will expect — as will the tourna-
ment’s official sponsor, Anheuser-Busch 
InBev — to be able to consume alcohol 
and otherwise behave like the sorts of fans 
willing to follow their teams across the 
world.  This party crowd, it is anticipated, 
will be concentrated in Lusail, a comfort-
able 15 kilometers removed from the rest 
of the population.  But there remains the 
far thornier issue of serving alcohol at 
competition venues.  In January 2012, 
FIFA set a deliberate precedent — and one 
that did not go unnoticed among Qataris 
— when it demanded that Brazil, the 2014 
World Cup host, set aside a legal ban on 
alcohol at sports venues, saying it “won’t 
negotiate” on its “right to sell beer” at 
events.14  Having just instituted its own ban 
on public consumption outside of a select 
number of Western hotels, Qatar’s leader-
ship is likely to face a similar showdown, 
either with FIFA or with conservatives in 
society and, indeed, within its own ranks.15
 On the political-military front the 
outlook is similar.  Not least because its 
continued economic viability depends 
upon a massive natural-gas field it shares 
with the Islamic Republic, Qatar has long 
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than Qatar’s defense cooperation with the 
United States is a recent deal with another 
Western power.  In July 2012, the news 
magazine Der Spiegel reported that Qatar 
was in the market for 200 German tanks 
at an estimated cost of $2.5 billion.16  For 
Qatar’s 8,500-strong army, the purchase 
would represent one tank for every 42.5 
soldiers.  Lacking the sheer manpower to 
maintain an adequate defensive force of its 
own, Qatar has taken out an expensive in-
surance policy with Western governments, 
one it will be loath to forfeit on account of 
public grumbling or ambivalence.
 Qatar’s leadership thus faces a deli-
cate dilemma.  The seeming lesson of the 
past year — learned from citizens’ fights 
for more equal wages, campaigns against 
alcohol and English-language hegemony, 
and other popular drives — amounts to the 
following: find a few hundred like-minded 
citizens, and one stands a good chance 
of influencing public policy.17  So far, the 
state has been able to strike a balance be-
tween the sensitivities of nationals and the 
liberties enjoyed by other residents.  But 
there is no guarantee that the next mat-
ter of public concern will allow the same 
political flexibility.
maintained peaceful, even amicable, rela-
tions with Iran, to the annoyance of U.S. 
policy makers.  Now, as tensions among 
Iran, the West and the Arab Gulf states 
intensify, the situation is likely to move 
toward the reverse, with Iran viewing 
Qatar’s strengthening ties with the United 
States with mounting suspicion. At the 
same time, Qatar and Iran are on rival 
sides of an entrenched conflict in Syria.  
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is pushing 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
toward closer political and military union 
for the express purpose of countering the 
perceived external and internal threat from 
Iran, which it accuses of fomenting politi-
cal unrest among Shia in Bahrain, in Saudi 
Arabia’s Eastern Province and elsewhere.  
Finally, Iran has repeatedly threatened to 
retaliate against American military targets 
in the Gulf in the event of an attack on its 
nuclear facilities. This makes U.S. resourc-
es deployed ostensibly to protect against 
the Iranian threat — including the afore-
mentioned missile-defense radar station 
whose existence was recently leaked to the 
press — at once an asset and a liability for 
Qatar and other Gulf host countries.
 In the end, however, the question is 
simply one of numbers.  More telling 
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